Pillars of Canadian Democracy:
the Crown
Depending on our ancestry and where we live, Canadians’ views of our monarchy range from neutral to benevolent. Unlike the British, French and Americans, we never fought against a king ourselves.
The Royal Villains of history: King John of Magna Carta, George III of the American Revolution and Louis XVI of the French one appear to us as almost comic figures: caricatures like Dr. Seuss’s “Yertle the Turtle” or Hugh Lofting’s King of Joliginki (Dr. Dolittle).
Probably our most rabid republicans are those nationalists, both French and English speaking, who would rather have some homegrown hero walking a red carpet than one from “away,” or politicians who aspire to be President rather than Premier.
At the opposite pole are First Nations who looked to the Crown as a protector. Crown-appointed Governors were generally concerned with keeping order, and this meant protecting aboriginal lands. Elected local politicians are often more inclined to cater to business interests including speculators and land grabbers. “Indian lands” were one of the grievances in the US Declaration in Independence; the distinct society guaranteed in the 1774 Quebec Act was another.
If you’re a member of a minority of any kind, you’ll be more inclined to trust yourself to the appointed representative of a far-off Queen than to a declaration in the name of The People, particularly if they’re speaking in a loud voice and coming in your direction in a wave. And if you find yourself in criminal court, you may be less intimidated to find yourself charged in the name of Her Majesty the Queen than to hear that you’re “versus the People” in the proceedings.
These are some of the psychological underpinnings of the Canadian monarchy. Add to that the fact that for 75% of the years since we gained Responsible Government in 1846, we’ve had women on the throne. Since elected public leaders were almost all male for most of that time, the Canadian psyche has included strong female figures on our currency and postage stamps as well as in public and classroom portraits, and this has made a difference in how we see ourselves.
The administrative and political side of the Crown, regardless of the gender or nationality of who wears it, is a 3-level reality. We have:
- an international Head of State: the Queen who lives in Buckingham Palace (among other residences), and presides over a global community (the Commonwealth)
- a resident Head of State: the Governor General who lives in Rideau Hall and presides at the opening of Parliament, and confers military and other honours (the Order of Canada)
- provincial heads of state (lieutenant governors), some who have residences, and who relate to their provincial governments as the Governor General does to the federal government
If they are people of distinction, they add class, grace and presence to the functioning of government. They do not have to please anyone.
The challenge of Canada’s Crown is not its dominance but that it is diminishing. Many powers once held by the Crown’s representatives are now wielded by first ministers with no checks or balances on them.
The erosion of the role of the Crown in Canada began under Liberal PM Mackenzie King 90 years ago. For a time Conservatives, with a commitment to historic ties, resisted this. Later Conservative governments including the present one have diminished the influence of the Vice regal representatives in government at the same time as they restore British symbolism that has nothing more than ceremonial value.
In the late 1950s the Speech from the Throne, read by the Governor General, still contained the reference to “my government.” In the 1960s this changed to “the government.” Fifty years later “my government” is back—not for the Queen’s representatives but for premiers and prime ministers who take their winning the leadership as a mandate to put their personal mark on the shape of the government.
Vice regal representatives are now largely social figures. They act as cyphers to first ministers and are no longer briefed or consulted by heads of government on government affairs. Still serving in the name of the Crown, they are now beholden to the PM who appointed them.
The final stage in the legal transformation of Weimar Germany into a dictatorship took place when Head of State Paul von Hindenburg died in 1934. Hindenburg had already signed orders in council put forward by the National Socialist government suspending civil liberties and giving the head of government power to enact legislation by decree.
With Hindenburg’s passing, the offices of Head of State (President) and Head of Government (Chancellor) were merged. This measure was endorsed by a 90% vote in a national plebiscite. The members of the army now swore an oath of personal allegiance to the Führer. Power was now in his hands alone and the transformation was complete. No further approvals stood in the way of the Leader’s wishes becoming law.
In his last year Hindenburg had largely abdicated the powers of his office as a watchdog on the government. In the public perception, then, an independent Head of State may have seemed redundant.
We’re not there in Canada—yet. The Constitution Act 1667 requires unanimity of the federal and all ten provincial governments before such a measure could be undertaken. There are, however, many ill-informed Canadians who consider our constitutional monarchy a needless expense rather than the pillar of democracy that it is.
Following the “Night of the Long Knives” (a purge of leftist paramilitary elements of the National Socialist Party) in 1934, a recent German immigrant to Canada was asked on the CBC what she thought of Der Führer. Her reply: “Nothing beats a good professional Kaiser” (the pre-1919 German Head of State).
This highlights the value of a separation between the Head of State and the Head of Government. The First World War followed Kaiser Wilhelm’s decision to dismiss his Chancellor Bismarck and to be his own Head of Government. The Second War followed the decision of the Chancellor to combine the Head of State/Commander in Chief position with his own on the death of President Von Hindenburg.
Canada does not need another house of hooting rabble
Elections not the way to accomplish much-needed Senate reform
David W. Watts
Saturday, December 01, 2007
The last prime minister to propose putting Senate reform to the people of Canada in an election was John Diefenbaker. His Conservative government had been thwarted in its attempt to fire Bank of Canada governor James Coyne by a bill in the Commons.
Liberal Senators felt Coyne should have a hearing and called him to testify. He made his case, resigned, and the Senate defeated the government bill to fire him.
Diefenbaker had a better chance of effecting change in 1961 than Stephen Harper does today. He had 207 seats, the largest Commons majority in Canada to that time, before adoption of the amending formula required support of seven provinces. Had he won re-election on the issue, senators would have had to roll over and Westminster, keeper of our Constitution then, would have enacted an amendment without more ado.
Patriation of the Constitution, court rulings and failure of the Charlottetown accord have made radical Senate reform virtually impossible. There remains the possibility of incremental change such as term limits or provincial elections the prime minister is proposing.
Insistence on election, however, weakens the fundamental purposes for which the Senate was set up. Its original two objectives, to balance "rep by pop" in the Commons with representation by region, and to be a brake on hasty legislation by the Commons, are as valid now as ever and have been served by the Senate's simply being there.
The first principle is reflected by four regions of 24 seats each (the Maritimes, Ontario, Quebec and the West) with the subsequent addition of Newfoundland and Labrador (four seats) and the three territories with one each.
The second principle, "sober second thought," has also served us. This happened when the Senate defeated the1961 bill to fire Coyne and an attempt to re-criminalize abortion in 1992. Both times public opinion supported the Senate and the government backed down.
Being unelected did not stop the Senate from playing its part as a check and balance in these instances. John A. Macdonald foresaw that before Confederation: "There would be no use of an Upper House, if it did not exercise the right of opposing the legislation of the Lower House. It would be of no value were it a mere chamber for registering the decrees of the Lower House. It must be independent, for it is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, but it will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate and understood wishes of the people ... ."
This principle is also served in committee work. Senators with expertise study legislation and reports line by line: work for which corporations recruit and pay outside directors.
This type of fine tuning needs to be done to make any democracy work. It is best done by non-elected officials who are not grandstanding. And it is best done in a legislative body where it can be scrutinized by the public, and not in the offices of officials and their staff.
Tune in to hearings of a Senate committee on CPAC and compare it to a Commons committee. Senators are generally courteous to each other and to the witnesses they call. When they argue, it is over matters of substance and not simply to score political points.
There is nothing wrong with appointments to fill public office. Even in the U.S., state governors fill mid-term vacancies of judgeships and senatorships by appointment. In some federal systems upper representative councils are named by lower elected bodies.
Pierre Trudeau's Senate appointments included retired Alberta premier Ernest Manning and other non-Liberals. He proposed that premiers name senators, offering to transform the Senate into a House of the Provinces. The premiers did not take him up on it.
The Senate became an issue in 1984 when Trudeau made a rash of appointments at the end of his 16 years. Brian Mulroney used this to discredit the Liberals and win the ensuing election. In office, his patronage surpassed Trudeau's. To enact the GST, he named eight additional senators who would tip the balance in favour.
Reaction to these excesses spawned the Reform Party with its platform of a Triple-E, American-style Senate as a brake on federal power: Equal, Elected and Effective.
Equality of provinces, most difficult to sell, has been abandoned. Effectiveness depends on Election. Harper says he will appoint no further senators who are not elected in their provinces, offering to broaden their base by surrendering a prime ministerial prerogative.
Yet he can enhance Senate effectiveness simply by broadening the base of appointment. This can be done in various ways. Nominations can simply be solicited from the provinces. Some may make theirs through cabinets, some in assemblies, others by direct election.
Alternately, the process might remain in Ottawa in a multi-party committee, proportional to the vote in the last election.
Any of these approaches, judiciously applied, would enhance the Senate. Simple election may not. If it means two houses given to political grandstanding, we're better with what we have.
A Roman Senator in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar describes the Commons well: the rabble ... hooted and clapped their chapped hands and threw up their sweaty night-caps and uttered such a deal of stinking breath.
It is not by aping another upper house in another political tradition, but by examining the intent of our own and bringing our practice into line with current realities, that we will progress.
The Fathers of Confederation agreed that the Senate was to be regionally based, it was to be a body of elders and it was to place considered second thought ahead of partisanship.
Excellence, Equilibrium and Experience are the qualities we need. Election is not enough.
Stephen Harper must focus on nominations by the provinces. This may eventually lead to election in regions where it is a priority. If he is not flexible here, his Senate fulminations will go no further than Diefenbaker's 46 years ago.
David Watts is an Edmonton writer
© The Edmonton Journal 2007
Elections not the way to accomplish much-needed Senate reform
David W. Watts
Saturday, December 01, 2007
The last prime minister to propose putting Senate reform to the people of Canada in an election was John Diefenbaker. His Conservative government had been thwarted in its attempt to fire Bank of Canada governor James Coyne by a bill in the Commons.
Liberal Senators felt Coyne should have a hearing and called him to testify. He made his case, resigned, and the Senate defeated the government bill to fire him.
Diefenbaker had a better chance of effecting change in 1961 than Stephen Harper does today. He had 207 seats, the largest Commons majority in Canada to that time, before adoption of the amending formula required support of seven provinces. Had he won re-election on the issue, senators would have had to roll over and Westminster, keeper of our Constitution then, would have enacted an amendment without more ado.
Patriation of the Constitution, court rulings and failure of the Charlottetown accord have made radical Senate reform virtually impossible. There remains the possibility of incremental change such as term limits or provincial elections the prime minister is proposing.
Insistence on election, however, weakens the fundamental purposes for which the Senate was set up. Its original two objectives, to balance "rep by pop" in the Commons with representation by region, and to be a brake on hasty legislation by the Commons, are as valid now as ever and have been served by the Senate's simply being there.
The first principle is reflected by four regions of 24 seats each (the Maritimes, Ontario, Quebec and the West) with the subsequent addition of Newfoundland and Labrador (four seats) and the three territories with one each.
The second principle, "sober second thought," has also served us. This happened when the Senate defeated the1961 bill to fire Coyne and an attempt to re-criminalize abortion in 1992. Both times public opinion supported the Senate and the government backed down.
Being unelected did not stop the Senate from playing its part as a check and balance in these instances. John A. Macdonald foresaw that before Confederation: "There would be no use of an Upper House, if it did not exercise the right of opposing the legislation of the Lower House. It would be of no value were it a mere chamber for registering the decrees of the Lower House. It must be independent, for it is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, but it will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate and understood wishes of the people ... ."
This principle is also served in committee work. Senators with expertise study legislation and reports line by line: work for which corporations recruit and pay outside directors.
This type of fine tuning needs to be done to make any democracy work. It is best done by non-elected officials who are not grandstanding. And it is best done in a legislative body where it can be scrutinized by the public, and not in the offices of officials and their staff.
Tune in to hearings of a Senate committee on CPAC and compare it to a Commons committee. Senators are generally courteous to each other and to the witnesses they call. When they argue, it is over matters of substance and not simply to score political points.
There is nothing wrong with appointments to fill public office. Even in the U.S., state governors fill mid-term vacancies of judgeships and senatorships by appointment. In some federal systems upper representative councils are named by lower elected bodies.
Pierre Trudeau's Senate appointments included retired Alberta premier Ernest Manning and other non-Liberals. He proposed that premiers name senators, offering to transform the Senate into a House of the Provinces. The premiers did not take him up on it.
The Senate became an issue in 1984 when Trudeau made a rash of appointments at the end of his 16 years. Brian Mulroney used this to discredit the Liberals and win the ensuing election. In office, his patronage surpassed Trudeau's. To enact the GST, he named eight additional senators who would tip the balance in favour.
Reaction to these excesses spawned the Reform Party with its platform of a Triple-E, American-style Senate as a brake on federal power: Equal, Elected and Effective.
Equality of provinces, most difficult to sell, has been abandoned. Effectiveness depends on Election. Harper says he will appoint no further senators who are not elected in their provinces, offering to broaden their base by surrendering a prime ministerial prerogative.
Yet he can enhance Senate effectiveness simply by broadening the base of appointment. This can be done in various ways. Nominations can simply be solicited from the provinces. Some may make theirs through cabinets, some in assemblies, others by direct election.
Alternately, the process might remain in Ottawa in a multi-party committee, proportional to the vote in the last election.
Any of these approaches, judiciously applied, would enhance the Senate. Simple election may not. If it means two houses given to political grandstanding, we're better with what we have.
A Roman Senator in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar describes the Commons well: the rabble ... hooted and clapped their chapped hands and threw up their sweaty night-caps and uttered such a deal of stinking breath.
It is not by aping another upper house in another political tradition, but by examining the intent of our own and bringing our practice into line with current realities, that we will progress.
The Fathers of Confederation agreed that the Senate was to be regionally based, it was to be a body of elders and it was to place considered second thought ahead of partisanship.
Excellence, Equilibrium and Experience are the qualities we need. Election is not enough.
Stephen Harper must focus on nominations by the provinces. This may eventually lead to election in regions where it is a priority. If he is not flexible here, his Senate fulminations will go no further than Diefenbaker's 46 years ago.
David Watts is an Edmonton writer
© The Edmonton Journal 2007
Canada's Unlikely Champion of Federalism
Quebec has given Ottawa more than a few headaches
But it has also played a crucial role in shaping our nation's democratic institutions.
David W. Watts
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Quebec's role in preventing a Harper majority on Oct. 14 was not the first time the province has been pivotal in Canadian democracy. In 1958, Quebecois gave John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives a huge majority, as their support of William Lyon Mackenzie King had earlier given the country 22 years of unbroken Liberal rule.
Neither of these men were native Quebec sons, yet Quebec was crucial to their political aspirations. And often when Quebecers have chosen to support local parties (as they did with the Creditistes in the 1960s and with the Bloc Quebecois in more recent times), this has translated into minority governments in Ottawa.
Yet Quebec's support for a particular party or leader has not been as crucial as has been its role in shaping Canada's democratic institutions and patterns themselves. When we think of Quebec's legacy to Canada, democracy is something we usually don't think of. Our pluralism, culture and international identity are things we can link to the heritage of New France and Quebec. But democracy? That we see as British and American innovation.
We're taught that Confederation was a melding of federalism -- an American idea -- with British parliamentary institutions. That French-Canadians lived under feudalism until the British arrived. That they were hostile or indifferent to representative government until loyalists from the Thirteen Colonies demanded it. That even then Quebec was reluctant and had to be split so English-speaking settlers who wanted an elected assembly could have one, while French-Canadians who didn't could keep their authoritarian rule.
Some English-Canadian biases go farther. Few still quote John George Lambton, Lord Durham, who used the Bible story of Esau and Jacob to support dominance of the French by the English. But we hark back to Maurice Duplessis, and conveniently skip over the Quiet Revolution and Rene Leveque's democratic reforms. We focus on Jacques Parizeau's line about Quebec voters as lobsters who could be enticed into a trap with no turning back. And we quote Pierre Trudeau, that basically French-Canadians have never really believed in democracy, and English-Canadians have never believed in it for anyone but themselves.
But there's another take on this topic we need to hear about in this year of Quebec's 400th anniversary.
It's of Lower Canadian reformers who worked with Upper Canadian colleagues to win responsible government. It's of Quebec Fathers of Confederation who, when English-speaking counterparts wanted a unitary system of government, held out for a federal one.
OUR OWN NATIONAL IDENTITY
It is of Quebec politicians who resisted the growth of federal power, took their case to the Privy Council and won a ruling that provinces are sovereign in their fields of exclusive jurisdiction. It is of Quebecers who pushed Canadians to adopt citizenship and symbols of their own when others were content to be British and leave the constitution in London.
It's of a Quebecer who was not prepared to accept supremacy of a Parliament that had permitted conscription and internment of minorities, and who enacted a Charter of Rights and Freedoms to prevent that. This is Quebec's legacy to Canada we need to know about.
We often hear that Canada's gaining responsible government was simply aping what Britons had already, and that Britain was prepared to grant this to avoid a repeat of her experience with the American colonies. These explanations sell us short.
In the "Little England" attitude in vogue at Westminster at the time, Britain was prepared to grant independence to her Canadian colonies had they made it clear this was what they wanted. It's because Canada and French-Canadians saw continued connection to the Crown as guaranteeing their rights, that this did not happen.
Second, while Britain had parliamentary supremacy since 1660 and cabinet government since the American Revolution, Britain's Parliament included a powerful House of Lords that had a veto over the Commons until a century ago. Many ministries were still led from the upper house. Look at the 19th-century British PMs who very often were "Lord so-and-so."
Canada was the world's first regime to place control of the executive solely in the hands of an elective assembly. While Britain's Lord Durham recommended this measure -- after discussions with Canadians -- his recommendation was initially rejected by Whitehall, which accepted his other recommendation that French-Canadians should be assimilated.
It was the French-Canadians -- the group Durham had dismissed -- that made possible his first recommendation. A group of reform-minded franco-phones, led by Louis Hippolyte Lafontaine, joined with reformers under Robert Baldwin to win control of the Legislative Assembly. That forced the next British ministry to grant responsible government to the Canadians simply to avoid deadlock and a possible recurrence of the strife of 1837-38.
Quebecers then played a decisive role in the decades that led to 1867. The first chair of talks for a wider union was Etienne Tache. While John A. Macdonald and the English-speaking delegates preferred a Westminster-type legislative union, it was the Quebec delegates' insistence on a federal system with provinces that was adopted.
Federalism, with its division of powers and written constitution setting out the powers, we owe to Quebec. We had "Confederation," rather than the "union" Durham proposed and English-speaking delegates favoured, because of Quebec.
Ask an Albertan, a British Columbian, or an Atlantic Canadian, what guarantees their democracy. They'll probably not launch into a discussion of Parliament, its traditions, or the charade of question period. They'll probably point to provincial governments, and the checks and balances that play off between them and Ottawa. They may also mention the charter that limits the power of all governments. These are the achievements of Quebecers in 1866 and 1982.
QUEBEC MISUNDERSTOOD
How do we reconcile this with the reportedly feudal history of New France? We start by admitting we may have got it wrong: that early Quebec may not have been as feudal as we believed, and that seeing it that way has distorted our view of present Quebec.
New France was unusually progressive among colonial societies of its day, with its own three-pillar system of checks and balances that divided executive power.
Feudalism in Europe was a system to hold land and maintain social class. New France's seigneurial system was intended to open the land, and bring it into production. A seigneur was "senior" of a tract under development -- a first kid on the block -- who shared many responsibilities with the habitants. The colony's purpose was not simply to ship furs, timber and fish to the homeland, but to build a new society with an internal economy. Women and men contributed to this.
Central to colonial life was not the governor but the intendent: a post created by Louis XIV to give him a hands-on presence, oversee economic development and report to him directly, bypassing the governor. Having two officials reporting independently was intended to strengthen royal control. But with an intervening ocean and the Saint Lawrence frozen a third of the year, it had the effect of fostering a more equitable society.
The governor took precedence when the colony was under attack. The intendent dealt with the seigneurs: a role the governor would have held in a top-down society. The Church assumed responsibility for health, welfare and education. But as most of these institutions -- hospitals, schools and relief -- had been founded by women, leadership here was dispersed, though exercised in the name of the bishop.
The trio of governor, intendent and bishop, representing military, economic and social sectors, created a fluid social order. The lack of an elected assembly was not oppressive because without a large population, the gulf between people and their leaders was not great.
The intendent departed along with French authority in 1759. However, British governors James Murray and Sir Guy Carleton appreciated the quality of French-Canadian society. They guaranteed its integrity in the 1774 Quebec Act, and later when they separated Lower and Upper Canada in the wake of Loyalist immigration from the fledgling U.S.
Canadian democracy is a hybrid of elements brought from the United States, Britain and New France. Refugees from the U.S. claimed representative institutions they had known in the Thirteen Colonies. A few wise British governors steeped in Parliamentary tradition moderated those claims. They realized that to give populist government to a pluralist society was to put Catholic and Protestant, French and English, at each others' throats.
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Quebecers who had preceded both by 150 years had a deep attachment to the country and a system that had allowed them to flourish. Habitants of New France were not peasants, and their leaders were mentors with collective rights and responsibilities, not overlords.
Why link Canada's democracy to the founding of Quebec that occurred 250 years earlier? Because to the Quebecois, homes and governance are not solitudes, isolated abstractions as they often are for English-speaking Canadians. They are parts of a whole, which is why it is appropriate that Quebecers celebrate their 400th anniversary recognized as la nation par excellence they are at the heart of a Canada that has grown from them.
Building his habitation by Samuel de Champlain ("level field") was a first step, followed, as Gilles Vigneault points out, by a sense of shared belonging. It is from this ground that a sense of rights, individual and collective, grows up--a sense that eventually stretches and changes as it encounters others who view these differently.
Sir Adolphe Routier's original version of O Canada, written in French 26 years before it was sung in English (at Quebec's 300th anniversary), brings these aspects together. In place of the mindless repetition of "stand on guards for thee" in the first English versions, it affirms:
Your worth (O Canada) steeped in faith
Will protect our homes and our rights.
Without a functioning society at its basis, there can be no functioning democracy. In 1608, Champlain laid the foundation for both.
David Watts is an Edmonton writer
© The Edmonton Journal 2008
Quebec has given Ottawa more than a few headaches
But it has also played a crucial role in shaping our nation's democratic institutions.
David W. Watts
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Quebec's role in preventing a Harper majority on Oct. 14 was not the first time the province has been pivotal in Canadian democracy. In 1958, Quebecois gave John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives a huge majority, as their support of William Lyon Mackenzie King had earlier given the country 22 years of unbroken Liberal rule.
Neither of these men were native Quebec sons, yet Quebec was crucial to their political aspirations. And often when Quebecers have chosen to support local parties (as they did with the Creditistes in the 1960s and with the Bloc Quebecois in more recent times), this has translated into minority governments in Ottawa.
Yet Quebec's support for a particular party or leader has not been as crucial as has been its role in shaping Canada's democratic institutions and patterns themselves. When we think of Quebec's legacy to Canada, democracy is something we usually don't think of. Our pluralism, culture and international identity are things we can link to the heritage of New France and Quebec. But democracy? That we see as British and American innovation.
We're taught that Confederation was a melding of federalism -- an American idea -- with British parliamentary institutions. That French-Canadians lived under feudalism until the British arrived. That they were hostile or indifferent to representative government until loyalists from the Thirteen Colonies demanded it. That even then Quebec was reluctant and had to be split so English-speaking settlers who wanted an elected assembly could have one, while French-Canadians who didn't could keep their authoritarian rule.
Some English-Canadian biases go farther. Few still quote John George Lambton, Lord Durham, who used the Bible story of Esau and Jacob to support dominance of the French by the English. But we hark back to Maurice Duplessis, and conveniently skip over the Quiet Revolution and Rene Leveque's democratic reforms. We focus on Jacques Parizeau's line about Quebec voters as lobsters who could be enticed into a trap with no turning back. And we quote Pierre Trudeau, that basically French-Canadians have never really believed in democracy, and English-Canadians have never believed in it for anyone but themselves.
But there's another take on this topic we need to hear about in this year of Quebec's 400th anniversary.
It's of Lower Canadian reformers who worked with Upper Canadian colleagues to win responsible government. It's of Quebec Fathers of Confederation who, when English-speaking counterparts wanted a unitary system of government, held out for a federal one.
OUR OWN NATIONAL IDENTITY
It is of Quebec politicians who resisted the growth of federal power, took their case to the Privy Council and won a ruling that provinces are sovereign in their fields of exclusive jurisdiction. It is of Quebecers who pushed Canadians to adopt citizenship and symbols of their own when others were content to be British and leave the constitution in London.
It's of a Quebecer who was not prepared to accept supremacy of a Parliament that had permitted conscription and internment of minorities, and who enacted a Charter of Rights and Freedoms to prevent that. This is Quebec's legacy to Canada we need to know about.
We often hear that Canada's gaining responsible government was simply aping what Britons had already, and that Britain was prepared to grant this to avoid a repeat of her experience with the American colonies. These explanations sell us short.
In the "Little England" attitude in vogue at Westminster at the time, Britain was prepared to grant independence to her Canadian colonies had they made it clear this was what they wanted. It's because Canada and French-Canadians saw continued connection to the Crown as guaranteeing their rights, that this did not happen.
Second, while Britain had parliamentary supremacy since 1660 and cabinet government since the American Revolution, Britain's Parliament included a powerful House of Lords that had a veto over the Commons until a century ago. Many ministries were still led from the upper house. Look at the 19th-century British PMs who very often were "Lord so-and-so."
Canada was the world's first regime to place control of the executive solely in the hands of an elective assembly. While Britain's Lord Durham recommended this measure -- after discussions with Canadians -- his recommendation was initially rejected by Whitehall, which accepted his other recommendation that French-Canadians should be assimilated.
It was the French-Canadians -- the group Durham had dismissed -- that made possible his first recommendation. A group of reform-minded franco-phones, led by Louis Hippolyte Lafontaine, joined with reformers under Robert Baldwin to win control of the Legislative Assembly. That forced the next British ministry to grant responsible government to the Canadians simply to avoid deadlock and a possible recurrence of the strife of 1837-38.
Quebecers then played a decisive role in the decades that led to 1867. The first chair of talks for a wider union was Etienne Tache. While John A. Macdonald and the English-speaking delegates preferred a Westminster-type legislative union, it was the Quebec delegates' insistence on a federal system with provinces that was adopted.
Federalism, with its division of powers and written constitution setting out the powers, we owe to Quebec. We had "Confederation," rather than the "union" Durham proposed and English-speaking delegates favoured, because of Quebec.
Ask an Albertan, a British Columbian, or an Atlantic Canadian, what guarantees their democracy. They'll probably not launch into a discussion of Parliament, its traditions, or the charade of question period. They'll probably point to provincial governments, and the checks and balances that play off between them and Ottawa. They may also mention the charter that limits the power of all governments. These are the achievements of Quebecers in 1866 and 1982.
QUEBEC MISUNDERSTOOD
How do we reconcile this with the reportedly feudal history of New France? We start by admitting we may have got it wrong: that early Quebec may not have been as feudal as we believed, and that seeing it that way has distorted our view of present Quebec.
New France was unusually progressive among colonial societies of its day, with its own three-pillar system of checks and balances that divided executive power.
Feudalism in Europe was a system to hold land and maintain social class. New France's seigneurial system was intended to open the land, and bring it into production. A seigneur was "senior" of a tract under development -- a first kid on the block -- who shared many responsibilities with the habitants. The colony's purpose was not simply to ship furs, timber and fish to the homeland, but to build a new society with an internal economy. Women and men contributed to this.
Central to colonial life was not the governor but the intendent: a post created by Louis XIV to give him a hands-on presence, oversee economic development and report to him directly, bypassing the governor. Having two officials reporting independently was intended to strengthen royal control. But with an intervening ocean and the Saint Lawrence frozen a third of the year, it had the effect of fostering a more equitable society.
The governor took precedence when the colony was under attack. The intendent dealt with the seigneurs: a role the governor would have held in a top-down society. The Church assumed responsibility for health, welfare and education. But as most of these institutions -- hospitals, schools and relief -- had been founded by women, leadership here was dispersed, though exercised in the name of the bishop.
The trio of governor, intendent and bishop, representing military, economic and social sectors, created a fluid social order. The lack of an elected assembly was not oppressive because without a large population, the gulf between people and their leaders was not great.
The intendent departed along with French authority in 1759. However, British governors James Murray and Sir Guy Carleton appreciated the quality of French-Canadian society. They guaranteed its integrity in the 1774 Quebec Act, and later when they separated Lower and Upper Canada in the wake of Loyalist immigration from the fledgling U.S.
Canadian democracy is a hybrid of elements brought from the United States, Britain and New France. Refugees from the U.S. claimed representative institutions they had known in the Thirteen Colonies. A few wise British governors steeped in Parliamentary tradition moderated those claims. They realized that to give populist government to a pluralist society was to put Catholic and Protestant, French and English, at each others' throats.
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Quebecers who had preceded both by 150 years had a deep attachment to the country and a system that had allowed them to flourish. Habitants of New France were not peasants, and their leaders were mentors with collective rights and responsibilities, not overlords.
Why link Canada's democracy to the founding of Quebec that occurred 250 years earlier? Because to the Quebecois, homes and governance are not solitudes, isolated abstractions as they often are for English-speaking Canadians. They are parts of a whole, which is why it is appropriate that Quebecers celebrate their 400th anniversary recognized as la nation par excellence they are at the heart of a Canada that has grown from them.
Building his habitation by Samuel de Champlain ("level field") was a first step, followed, as Gilles Vigneault points out, by a sense of shared belonging. It is from this ground that a sense of rights, individual and collective, grows up--a sense that eventually stretches and changes as it encounters others who view these differently.
Sir Adolphe Routier's original version of O Canada, written in French 26 years before it was sung in English (at Quebec's 300th anniversary), brings these aspects together. In place of the mindless repetition of "stand on guards for thee" in the first English versions, it affirms:
Your worth (O Canada) steeped in faith
Will protect our homes and our rights.
Without a functioning society at its basis, there can be no functioning democracy. In 1608, Champlain laid the foundation for both.
David Watts is an Edmonton writer
© The Edmonton Journal 2008
Guardians of Democracy
Let’s not forget Senate’s strong, principled stands
Edmonton Journal, Friday, November 8 – David W. Watts
No topic took up more time during pre-Confederation debates than the Senate. Future Prime Minister John A. Macdonald had this to say:
"There would be no use of an Upper House, if it did not exercise …the right of opposing or amending or postponing the legislation of the Lower House. It would be of no value whatever were it a mere chamber for registering the decrees of the Lower House."
“It must be an independent House, having a free action of its own, for it is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, but it will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate and understood wishes of the people.”
Macdonald’s prediction has proven correct twice in the past 52 years when the Senate stood up to the House of Commons on an issue of principle with public support:
First was the Diefenbaker government’s attempt to fire Bank of Canada governor James Coyne in 1961. Coyne, appointed by the previous Liberal government, had spoken out against the Progressive Conservatives’ rampant spending that was fueling inflation.
With 208 seats in the Commons, the PCs had the largest majority of any government to date. They passed a bill declaring the Bank governorship vacant, refusing Coyne’s request for a hearing to explain his position.
The Liberal dominated Senate rejected the bill and the PM threatened to make Senate reform an issue in the next election. The Senate gave the Governor his requested hearing and he resigned, averting a constitutional crisis. Public opinion supported Coyne, feeling he had been wronged. The PCs appointed a new governor and left the Senate alone.
The second incident of a Senate that refused to back down occurred in the second term of the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney when the Supreme Court struck down Canada’s abortion law. The PCs were divided on the issue but introduced legislation to recriminalize abortion to appease social conservatives in the party’s base.
The Mulroney Conservatives had begun with an even larger majority (211 seats) than Diefenbaker’s and had appointed six additional senators to secure passage of the unpopular GST. But when it came to recriminalizing abortion, the Senate dug in its heels and defeated the bill, and the Commons did not try to reintroduce it.
Once again the unelected house refused to roll over before a powerful majority in the elected one. It did so because polling showed that the people, though ambivalent on abortion, were clearly opposed to recriminalization. The Senate vote reflected the public division of opinion rather than that of the PC party’s electoral base.
A third example of an assertive Upper House is germinating now with the Senate itself in question.
Till recently it seemed Senate change was finally in sight. A government intent on reform and an Official Opposition supporting abolition were waiting for the Supreme Court to set parameters for action. Publicized reports of extravagant expense claims by a few senators brought the public on board for the government’s intended initiative.
This past week polling has shown a shift as attention moves from the alleged misdeeds of Mike Duffy, Pamela Wallin and Patrick Brazeau to strong-arm tactics of the Prime Minister. If Harper is seen to use the same approach to eliminate the upper chamber without due process, the remaining senators might be idle no more.
Senators do not face re-election or need a leader’s signature for nomination. When it becomes apparent the prime minister has outstayed his welcome with the public, the senators may be prepared to use their latent power to bring him to heel. It was the barons (England’s Upper House), not freemen at large, who forced King John to sign Magna Carta when he encroached on their privileges.
If this plays out in keeping with existing trends, the Senate’s next play may not be “Strike Three—you’re out” but “Ball Four” with the Senate established on a firmer, legitimate base of public support.
A sober second thought is in order as we approach Remembrance Day. Lest we forget: most of the dictators we fought against were democratically elected and subsequently dismantled checks and balances on their power by legal and parliamentary means.
Our viceregal representatives, Supreme Court justices and appointed senators are more to be trusted when democracy is at risk than MPs who can be bought or browbeaten by a prime minister with his or her own agenda.
Let us not be in a hurry to eliminate these “unelected” guardians.
Let’s not forget Senate’s strong, principled stands
Edmonton Journal, Friday, November 8 – David W. Watts
No topic took up more time during pre-Confederation debates than the Senate. Future Prime Minister John A. Macdonald had this to say:
"There would be no use of an Upper House, if it did not exercise …the right of opposing or amending or postponing the legislation of the Lower House. It would be of no value whatever were it a mere chamber for registering the decrees of the Lower House."
“It must be an independent House, having a free action of its own, for it is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, but it will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate and understood wishes of the people.”
Macdonald’s prediction has proven correct twice in the past 52 years when the Senate stood up to the House of Commons on an issue of principle with public support:
First was the Diefenbaker government’s attempt to fire Bank of Canada governor James Coyne in 1961. Coyne, appointed by the previous Liberal government, had spoken out against the Progressive Conservatives’ rampant spending that was fueling inflation.
With 208 seats in the Commons, the PCs had the largest majority of any government to date. They passed a bill declaring the Bank governorship vacant, refusing Coyne’s request for a hearing to explain his position.
The Liberal dominated Senate rejected the bill and the PM threatened to make Senate reform an issue in the next election. The Senate gave the Governor his requested hearing and he resigned, averting a constitutional crisis. Public opinion supported Coyne, feeling he had been wronged. The PCs appointed a new governor and left the Senate alone.
The second incident of a Senate that refused to back down occurred in the second term of the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney when the Supreme Court struck down Canada’s abortion law. The PCs were divided on the issue but introduced legislation to recriminalize abortion to appease social conservatives in the party’s base.
The Mulroney Conservatives had begun with an even larger majority (211 seats) than Diefenbaker’s and had appointed six additional senators to secure passage of the unpopular GST. But when it came to recriminalizing abortion, the Senate dug in its heels and defeated the bill, and the Commons did not try to reintroduce it.
Once again the unelected house refused to roll over before a powerful majority in the elected one. It did so because polling showed that the people, though ambivalent on abortion, were clearly opposed to recriminalization. The Senate vote reflected the public division of opinion rather than that of the PC party’s electoral base.
A third example of an assertive Upper House is germinating now with the Senate itself in question.
Till recently it seemed Senate change was finally in sight. A government intent on reform and an Official Opposition supporting abolition were waiting for the Supreme Court to set parameters for action. Publicized reports of extravagant expense claims by a few senators brought the public on board for the government’s intended initiative.
This past week polling has shown a shift as attention moves from the alleged misdeeds of Mike Duffy, Pamela Wallin and Patrick Brazeau to strong-arm tactics of the Prime Minister. If Harper is seen to use the same approach to eliminate the upper chamber without due process, the remaining senators might be idle no more.
Senators do not face re-election or need a leader’s signature for nomination. When it becomes apparent the prime minister has outstayed his welcome with the public, the senators may be prepared to use their latent power to bring him to heel. It was the barons (England’s Upper House), not freemen at large, who forced King John to sign Magna Carta when he encroached on their privileges.
If this plays out in keeping with existing trends, the Senate’s next play may not be “Strike Three—you’re out” but “Ball Four” with the Senate established on a firmer, legitimate base of public support.
A sober second thought is in order as we approach Remembrance Day. Lest we forget: most of the dictators we fought against were democratically elected and subsequently dismantled checks and balances on their power by legal and parliamentary means.
Our viceregal representatives, Supreme Court justices and appointed senators are more to be trusted when democracy is at risk than MPs who can be bought or browbeaten by a prime minister with his or her own agenda.
Let us not be in a hurry to eliminate these “unelected” guardians.
Trudeaus and Senate: like Father, like Son?
Getting input from premiers could boost chamber’s legitimacy
Edmonton Journal, Wednesday, February 5, 2014 - David W.Watts
Justin Trudeau’s thoughts on the Senate are reminiscent of those of his father 43 years ago.
Pierre Trudeau’s appointments to the upper house included ten Conservatives and a Social Credit senator, Ernest C. Manning, just retired as Alberta’s longest serving Premier.
Manning was no Liberal supporter. His government had been the last Canadian holdout against state funded Medicare. He served in the Senate 13 years, bringing keen intelligence, political experience and a sense of gravitas to the “chamber of sober second thought.”
Appointees from outside his own party represented 10% of the total the elder Trudeau named to the Senate. He is virtually tied with Sir John A. Macdonald on this count.
Our first Prime Minister named 12 of the 91 he summoned to the Upper House from outside party ranks. Nine were opposition Liberals, the others without party affiliations.
In 25 months he served as PM, Paul Martin appointed 17 senators and five of these (almost 30%) came from outside his party. In percentage if not in total he leads the lot.
This is the record of nonpartisan Senate appointment in our system. Yes, it can be done and it has been done, in small doses. We need to ask ourselves, Why is it being done? and Is it a practice that can become sustainable?
Conservative prime ministers Brian Mulroney and Stephen Harper began office with highly visible nonpartisan appointments in the diplomatic field though not to the Senate. Mulroney named New Democrat Stephen Lewis Ambassador to the United Nations; Harper named NDP Premier Gary Doer as Ambassador to Washington.
The motivation for both appointments was clear and admitted by a Conservative worker who landed a government job the same day Lewis did. Both were distractions from IOUs being paid out: nonpartisan window dressing to cover partisanship in extremis.
Trudeau Sr. used Senate and other appointments effectively, and at times shamelessly.
His 1984 retirement was marked by a rash of appointments including Senate seats. This had a dual purpose: of rewarding those who had served him loyally, and of crippling his successor John Turner, who had been a thorn in his side for many of those years. Trudeau had watched the unravelling of government after Lester Pearson announced his retirement 16 years earlier, and knew that without the incentive of rewards, Parliament would become dysfunctional.
Political leaders maximize their power over the system to avoid challenges to that power. It is unrealistic, then, to trust an arms-length nomination process such as Justin Trudeau proposes, if this rests solely on the good will of a reforming prime minister.
What one prime minister gives, another—or even the same one later—can take away. Stephen Harper set up a parliamentary committee to review the appointment of his first Supreme Court appointee, Justice Marshal Rothstein, then dispensed with it for later nominations.
We can’t escape leader dominated politics any more than political parties.
We can however broaden the base of the nominations by increasing the number of leaders involved in the process.
A PM committed to reform, as Justin Trudeau says he will be, could alternate with provincial/territorial premiers in nominating candidates from their region. Pierre Trudeau put forward that very proposal in 1981.
Arrangements to collaborate on nominations with other first ministers would be by informal agreement. Such an agreement could prove durable as it reflects the central-regional power balance in our system.
A future PM tempted to act unilaterally could be deterred by the prospect of having the regional leaders allied against him or her on key issues.
Dividing power among legislative, executive and judicial arms, national, state and local interests, is usually seen as an American approach but it has a Canadian precedent.
The Constitution Act 1867 provided that the first Senators after Confederation would be nominated by the provinces, later vacancies filled by the Governor-General in Council.
Going back to the future of the Confederation arrangement—provincial input into Senate nominations—has advantages:
First, it will increase legitimacy of the appointments as they represent more than one party, government or leader.
Second, it can enhance the quality of candidates as each party puts forward its best names so not to be shown up by the others.
Third, it can be achieved in the climate of voluntary give-and-take that Justin Trudeau is now proposing.
Finally, the interests of federal and regional participants to make it work are intertwined and difficult to separate. As King John found out after agreeing to power share with the barons in Magna Carta, that will be a reform that may be hard to turn the clock back on.
Getting input from premiers could boost chamber’s legitimacy
Edmonton Journal, Wednesday, February 5, 2014 - David W.Watts
Justin Trudeau’s thoughts on the Senate are reminiscent of those of his father 43 years ago.
Pierre Trudeau’s appointments to the upper house included ten Conservatives and a Social Credit senator, Ernest C. Manning, just retired as Alberta’s longest serving Premier.
Manning was no Liberal supporter. His government had been the last Canadian holdout against state funded Medicare. He served in the Senate 13 years, bringing keen intelligence, political experience and a sense of gravitas to the “chamber of sober second thought.”
Appointees from outside his own party represented 10% of the total the elder Trudeau named to the Senate. He is virtually tied with Sir John A. Macdonald on this count.
Our first Prime Minister named 12 of the 91 he summoned to the Upper House from outside party ranks. Nine were opposition Liberals, the others without party affiliations.
In 25 months he served as PM, Paul Martin appointed 17 senators and five of these (almost 30%) came from outside his party. In percentage if not in total he leads the lot.
This is the record of nonpartisan Senate appointment in our system. Yes, it can be done and it has been done, in small doses. We need to ask ourselves, Why is it being done? and Is it a practice that can become sustainable?
Conservative prime ministers Brian Mulroney and Stephen Harper began office with highly visible nonpartisan appointments in the diplomatic field though not to the Senate. Mulroney named New Democrat Stephen Lewis Ambassador to the United Nations; Harper named NDP Premier Gary Doer as Ambassador to Washington.
The motivation for both appointments was clear and admitted by a Conservative worker who landed a government job the same day Lewis did. Both were distractions from IOUs being paid out: nonpartisan window dressing to cover partisanship in extremis.
Trudeau Sr. used Senate and other appointments effectively, and at times shamelessly.
His 1984 retirement was marked by a rash of appointments including Senate seats. This had a dual purpose: of rewarding those who had served him loyally, and of crippling his successor John Turner, who had been a thorn in his side for many of those years. Trudeau had watched the unravelling of government after Lester Pearson announced his retirement 16 years earlier, and knew that without the incentive of rewards, Parliament would become dysfunctional.
Political leaders maximize their power over the system to avoid challenges to that power. It is unrealistic, then, to trust an arms-length nomination process such as Justin Trudeau proposes, if this rests solely on the good will of a reforming prime minister.
What one prime minister gives, another—or even the same one later—can take away. Stephen Harper set up a parliamentary committee to review the appointment of his first Supreme Court appointee, Justice Marshal Rothstein, then dispensed with it for later nominations.
We can’t escape leader dominated politics any more than political parties.
We can however broaden the base of the nominations by increasing the number of leaders involved in the process.
A PM committed to reform, as Justin Trudeau says he will be, could alternate with provincial/territorial premiers in nominating candidates from their region. Pierre Trudeau put forward that very proposal in 1981.
Arrangements to collaborate on nominations with other first ministers would be by informal agreement. Such an agreement could prove durable as it reflects the central-regional power balance in our system.
A future PM tempted to act unilaterally could be deterred by the prospect of having the regional leaders allied against him or her on key issues.
Dividing power among legislative, executive and judicial arms, national, state and local interests, is usually seen as an American approach but it has a Canadian precedent.
The Constitution Act 1867 provided that the first Senators after Confederation would be nominated by the provinces, later vacancies filled by the Governor-General in Council.
Going back to the future of the Confederation arrangement—provincial input into Senate nominations—has advantages:
First, it will increase legitimacy of the appointments as they represent more than one party, government or leader.
Second, it can enhance the quality of candidates as each party puts forward its best names so not to be shown up by the others.
Third, it can be achieved in the climate of voluntary give-and-take that Justin Trudeau is now proposing.
Finally, the interests of federal and regional participants to make it work are intertwined and difficult to separate. As King John found out after agreeing to power share with the barons in Magna Carta, that will be a reform that may be hard to turn the clock back on.
Power of a simple ‘No’: Senate’s intended role
Fathers of Confederation wanted upper house to have unique role
Edmonton Journal, Tuesday, May 20, 2014 - David W. Watts
If we’re to trust our leaders—something Canadians still prefer to do—we need someone to be there for citizens who don’t have time to follow backroom plays or cynicism to see sleight-of-hand. Someone who can say a simple “No” to prevent our being backed into a corner.
Canada’s non-elected Senate was intended to do this. Elected politicians cannot because they have another interest: their own reelection. Getting reelected may mean having people forget what you said last time and drawing attention elsewhere.
Four types of appointees in Canada can fulfill this function in various ways: vice-regal representatives, officers of Parliament (Chief Electoral Officer, Auditor General), the Supreme Court and the Senate. Parliamentary officers are a recent innovation and their scope is limited to particular tasks. Vice-regal representatives have become largely ceremonial. The Supreme Court is proving effective, but has been “supreme” for only three decades. The Senate is the only one of these bulwarks that was part of our original constitutional architecture. The Fathers of Confederation spent more time discussing it than any other topic before them.
1. It was to be a council of elders, with a 30 year minimum age that did not apply to MPs in the House.
With life tenure, the average age in the Senate would be notably higher. “Seniors jokes’ that used to be told about the Senate pointed less to a flaw in the institution than to a culture that favours youth over the wisdom and experience of age.
A culture with reverse bias would tell stories about “brashness” and “hotheadedness” that reflect a Lower House where anyone can be elected! First Nations recognize elders’ importance. In maintaining this aspect of the Senate, we stand in solidarity with them.
2. Membership in the Senate was to be coopted, not contested.
In constitutional language, senators are “summoned” and candidates appointed have been shortlisted and scrutinized for service rendered including IOUs that can also be for service rendered.
Selecting senators rather than taking what elections produce balances government in three ways: It can provide expertise for cabinet and committees in fields not otherwise represented. It can provide seats in Cabinet for regions without government MPs. Elders’ presence is attainable this way, as seniors of distinction may not choose a new career in the bear pit of Commons politics.
3. The Senate was to be nationally representative on the basis of regions rather than of local interests.
While senators are allocated on the basis of provinces, their role is to reflect the country, not to represent provincial governments. Equality was not envisaged for provinces (Triple-E style) but among three original divisions (Maritimes, Québec and Ontario), now four, with the addition of the West and Newfoundland.
4. The Senate was to have a consultative, not compulsive role.
Polarization, closure, steamroller politics are Commons culture the upper house is to there to restrain, not replicate. Quick decisions are for dictators, not democrats. It’s no accident that many great political leaders, including Sir John A. Macdonald, were procrastinators. They realized speed is not essential; a durable consensus takes time to develop. That is why Sir John spoke at length on the Senate’s intended role.
He foresaw it exercising its role by re-vision and delay of Commons legislation rather than in deadlock that characterized relations between American upper and lower houses. Prolonging debate, amending, returning contentious legislation to the Commons, gave the House a chance to get it right. But he could also envisage the Senate’s going toe-to-toe with the House if it believed government was using a Commons majority to override interests of citizens at large.
Faced with rejection of legislation in the upper house, the government would have two choices. It could allow the measure to die, telling partisans “we tried,” or it could put the Senate’s support to the test by going to the voters. If the Senate’s reading of opinion proved correct, the government would be defeated. If the government was reelected, the Senate would not block it a second time.
Such intervention dates from antiquity. Rome’s government was dominated by aristocrats but the masses had input through tribunes seated outside the legislature within hearing of its debates. Tribunes called out Veto (“I forbid”) to stop measures not in the people’s interest.
This was the intent of Canada’s upper house. It was the intended role of US senators before it was eclipsed by their role as states’ representatives. States’ rights culminated in the Civil War. Forty-eight years later an amendment to the U.S. Constitution removed state governments’ power over senators, replacing appointment with direct election. .
Would-be reformers of Canada’s Senate, including the Reform Party, have taken the pre and post-17th Amendment US models. Those who advocate provincial appointment would shift the Senate’s role to a House focused on provincial concerns. An elected Canadian Senate would retain a federal focus but deadlock Parliament, US style, in competition between elected representatives in the two houses.
Both outcomes would be results of attempt to graft foreign measures onto Canada’s constitutional architecture. To avoid this, let’s remember the four-fold intent of our Fathers of Confederation and build on their foundation.
Fathers of Confederation wanted upper house to have unique role
Edmonton Journal, Tuesday, May 20, 2014 - David W. Watts
If we’re to trust our leaders—something Canadians still prefer to do—we need someone to be there for citizens who don’t have time to follow backroom plays or cynicism to see sleight-of-hand. Someone who can say a simple “No” to prevent our being backed into a corner.
Canada’s non-elected Senate was intended to do this. Elected politicians cannot because they have another interest: their own reelection. Getting reelected may mean having people forget what you said last time and drawing attention elsewhere.
Four types of appointees in Canada can fulfill this function in various ways: vice-regal representatives, officers of Parliament (Chief Electoral Officer, Auditor General), the Supreme Court and the Senate. Parliamentary officers are a recent innovation and their scope is limited to particular tasks. Vice-regal representatives have become largely ceremonial. The Supreme Court is proving effective, but has been “supreme” for only three decades. The Senate is the only one of these bulwarks that was part of our original constitutional architecture. The Fathers of Confederation spent more time discussing it than any other topic before them.
1. It was to be a council of elders, with a 30 year minimum age that did not apply to MPs in the House.
With life tenure, the average age in the Senate would be notably higher. “Seniors jokes’ that used to be told about the Senate pointed less to a flaw in the institution than to a culture that favours youth over the wisdom and experience of age.
A culture with reverse bias would tell stories about “brashness” and “hotheadedness” that reflect a Lower House where anyone can be elected! First Nations recognize elders’ importance. In maintaining this aspect of the Senate, we stand in solidarity with them.
2. Membership in the Senate was to be coopted, not contested.
In constitutional language, senators are “summoned” and candidates appointed have been shortlisted and scrutinized for service rendered including IOUs that can also be for service rendered.
Selecting senators rather than taking what elections produce balances government in three ways: It can provide expertise for cabinet and committees in fields not otherwise represented. It can provide seats in Cabinet for regions without government MPs. Elders’ presence is attainable this way, as seniors of distinction may not choose a new career in the bear pit of Commons politics.
3. The Senate was to be nationally representative on the basis of regions rather than of local interests.
While senators are allocated on the basis of provinces, their role is to reflect the country, not to represent provincial governments. Equality was not envisaged for provinces (Triple-E style) but among three original divisions (Maritimes, Québec and Ontario), now four, with the addition of the West and Newfoundland.
4. The Senate was to have a consultative, not compulsive role.
Polarization, closure, steamroller politics are Commons culture the upper house is to there to restrain, not replicate. Quick decisions are for dictators, not democrats. It’s no accident that many great political leaders, including Sir John A. Macdonald, were procrastinators. They realized speed is not essential; a durable consensus takes time to develop. That is why Sir John spoke at length on the Senate’s intended role.
He foresaw it exercising its role by re-vision and delay of Commons legislation rather than in deadlock that characterized relations between American upper and lower houses. Prolonging debate, amending, returning contentious legislation to the Commons, gave the House a chance to get it right. But he could also envisage the Senate’s going toe-to-toe with the House if it believed government was using a Commons majority to override interests of citizens at large.
Faced with rejection of legislation in the upper house, the government would have two choices. It could allow the measure to die, telling partisans “we tried,” or it could put the Senate’s support to the test by going to the voters. If the Senate’s reading of opinion proved correct, the government would be defeated. If the government was reelected, the Senate would not block it a second time.
Such intervention dates from antiquity. Rome’s government was dominated by aristocrats but the masses had input through tribunes seated outside the legislature within hearing of its debates. Tribunes called out Veto (“I forbid”) to stop measures not in the people’s interest.
This was the intent of Canada’s upper house. It was the intended role of US senators before it was eclipsed by their role as states’ representatives. States’ rights culminated in the Civil War. Forty-eight years later an amendment to the U.S. Constitution removed state governments’ power over senators, replacing appointment with direct election. .
Would-be reformers of Canada’s Senate, including the Reform Party, have taken the pre and post-17th Amendment US models. Those who advocate provincial appointment would shift the Senate’s role to a House focused on provincial concerns. An elected Canadian Senate would retain a federal focus but deadlock Parliament, US style, in competition between elected representatives in the two houses.
Both outcomes would be results of attempt to graft foreign measures onto Canada’s constitutional architecture. To avoid this, let’s remember the four-fold intent of our Fathers of Confederation and build on their foundation.